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1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, an abundance of empirical evidence has emerged to indicate an inverse U-shaped
relationship between environmental degradation and economic growth. Evidence of this pattern, called
an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) due to its similarity to the relationship found between income and
income inequality by Kuznets (1955), has been found for a diverse set of environmental indicators. However,
relatively less work has been done to develop the underlying theory of the EKC. Understanding the economic
theory that drives the EKC is critical since it allows researchers to obtain better empirical estimates, and
leads to more e¢ cient public policy. In this paper, we contribute to the theoretical development of the
EKC hypothesis by focusing on the ownership structure in markets for renewable resources. Specically,
we develop a model showing that the evolution of private property rights, over a previously open-access
resource, may be su¢ cient to generate a U-shaped pattern for environmental quality.
Most researchers trace the origins of this literature to Grossman and Krueger (1992, 1995), who argued
that increased trade resulting from the NAFTA could improve environmental quality; and Shak and Bandy-
opadhyay (1992), who examined the relationship between income and environmental quality in a background
paper for the 1992 World Development Report. Both studies found EKCs for sulfur dioxide, suspended
particulate matter, and various measures of water quality. Subsequently, researchers have found EKCs
for various forms of environmental degradation including carbon (Holtz-Eakin and Seldon, 1995; and Suri
and Chapman, 1998), deforestation (Cropper and Gri¢ ths, 1994; and Bhattari and Hammig, 2001), lead
emissions (Hilton and Levinson, 1998), and hazardous waste exposure (Wang, et al, 1998).1
Existing theoretical explanations for the EKC focus on structural changes in economies, pollution abate-
ment technology, and the income elasticity of demand for the environment. Panayotou (1993) suggests that
this non-monotonicity occurs naturally as developing countries shift from largely agrarian to industrial, then
to service based economies. As the composition of output changes, so too does the ow of environmental
degradation. Andreoni and Levinson (2001) propose that an EKC may emerge as a result of increasing
economies of scale in the abatement of pollution. In general, one would expect that the technologies neces-
sary for the abatement of environmental damage, or recovery of damaged resources, will be more plentiful in
countries with greater incomes. Others have stressed shifts in consumption choices over income and envi-
ronmental quality (Lopez, 1994; Stokey, 1998). Low income countries with an abundance of environmental
amenity nd it desirable to transform resources into income. As income rises, and environmental quality
declines, the marginal value of an income falls relative to the marginal value of the environment. Eventually,
consumers choose to buy "cleaner" goods, or demand less polluting production processes.
2 Property Rights and Environmental Degradation
This paper shows that environmental quality, as measured by the productive capacity of a natural resource,
will follow a U-shaped pattern as ownership of the resource gradually shifts from communal to private
property. Intuitively, the resource initially su¤ers from a tragedy of the commons since the cost of each
agents usage is shared equally by the entire community. In order to avoid the commons problem, some
agents are willing to incur a one-time xed cost to privatize a portion of the resource. Gradually, as more
of the resource shifts to private ownership, environmental quality begins to improve.
1However, recent empirical work has questioned the robustness of these results. See for example, Harbaugh, Levinson, and
Wilson (2002), Stern and Common (2001) de Bruyn, van den Bergh, and Opschoor (1998), or Agras and Chapman (1999).
These works underscore the importance of theoretically clarifying the determinants of environmental quality change.
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Low income communities with an abundance of environmental amenities, and no well dened or enforced
property rights, will tend to overexploit their resources due to the cost externalities associated with each
individuals use. Over time, as resources become scarcer, the need to monitor and regulate resource ex-
traction becomes more pressing. Also, as income grows, the technological and social conditions necessary
to develop and enforce regulations emerge. While this regulation may take the form of centrally planned
quota system, in many cases it is more e¢ cient to nd a decentralized solution through privatization. This
paper focuses on the latter case, but either can result in more sustainable resource use.
It has been argued that the EKC is an empirical proxy for the evolution of property rights, and the
incentive structure embedded within them (Yandle, Bhattarai, and Vijayaraghavan, 2004). Case studies
of the pastoral regions of china (Longworth and Williamson, 1993) suggest that the absence of property
rights have led to overgrazing. Similarly, Dennen (1976) provides evidence that Cattlemens Associations
improved the productivity of rangeland in the late 19th century United States. During the Edo period in
Japan, 1603 - 1867, economic growth brought the demand for lumber in conict with the demand for arable
land. Depleted forests threatened agricultural production by disrupting the ow of water to the low-lands,
by ooding and river-silting, for example. As a result the Japanese developed several policies to combat the
problem including the practice of Yamawari, by which communal land is divided among villagers as private
property.2 More recently, private property rights have been extended to wildlife in southern Africa in an
attempt to preserve the Black Rhinoceros and other species.
3 The Model
We assume an economy in which a population of n identical individuals may exploit a common property
resource, also of size n: Dene t as the quality of the resource, in terms of its productivity, at time t: In
the absence of human exploitation, resource quality evolves according to the di¤erence equation
t = t 1 +  (  t 1) (1)
where  is the unexploited steady state level of resource quality, and  2 (0; 1) is a parameter that describes
the speed of adjustment.
Individuals can choose either to exploit the resource as a commons, or, at a cost to be dened below,
appropriate exactly one unit of the commons and exploit it as a private resource. Let Zt =
Pt
j=1 Zj
represent the total quantity of the commons that has been privatized prior to period t: Then, in any time
period, the total quantity of common property available to the producers is given by n Ptj=1 Zj :
Each producer lives for one period and is endowed with a xed quantity of time, T , that may be devoted
to exploiting the resource, lit; or leisure, T   lit: Time devoted to exploitation of the resource is transformed
into a consumption good, cit; according to the function
cit = tlit

1
H

(2)
where H represents the rate of exploitation and the parameter  is assumed to lie within the interval (0; 1) :
This implies that production of the consumption good increases, at a decreasing rate as the inverse of the
rate of exploitation increases. In other words, a reduction in the rate of exploitation increases production.
2See Totman (1984).
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The consumption good can be given quite a broad interpretation, as an example it might represent exploiting
land for grazing cattle, or, alternatively, it could involve the consumption associated with the observation of
native ora and fauna.
Producer i receives utility from consumption and leisure in period t according to the function
uit = (cit)

(T   lit) : (3)
We make the standard assumptions that  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) so that the utility function possesses
diminishing marginal returns.
For common property, the rate of exploitation is given by the ratio of the sum of all labor applied to the
commons to the total quantity of common property available. For private property, the rate of exploitation
is given by the ratio of an individual producers labor e¤ort to their privately held resources. Since private
resources are xed at one, the rate of exploitation can be written as
H =
( P
i l
c
it
n Ptj=1 Zj if the resource is exploited as commons
lrit if the resource is privatized
(4)
where the superscripts c and r indicate common and private property respectively.
Exploitation reduces resource quality according to a damage function, d (H), with d0 (H) > 0: Hence
introducing this argument into expression (1) we see that resource quality evolves according to
t = t 1 +  (  t 1)  d (H) : (5)
or, as will prove algebraically convenient later,
t = 
t 1 +K; (6)
where 
 = 1  andK =   d (H) : The dynamics of resource quality thus depend on the damage function,
d (H) ; which itself depends on the rate at which the resource is exploited, H. Below we demonstrate that
exploitation rates di¤er systematically across property right regimes, hence changes in property right regimes
impact the dynamics of resource quality in a way that will shortly be made precise.
3.1 Property Rights Regimes
Each unit of the resource may be exploited as either common or private property. We assume that, if an
individual chooses, they may convert one unit of common resources to private at a cost in terms of time
given by
pt = p (Zt) (7)
where Zt =
Pt
j=1 Zj : Assume further that p
0 (Zt) > 0; and p00 (Zt) > 0, so that the cost function is increasing
and convex in the amount of resources privatized. This cost function can be interpreted as representing
both time spent establishing a private claim on the resource and/or the expense of installing an exclusion
mechanism. That successive units of the resource are more costly to privatize may be due to di¢ culties
associated with geography or terrain as, for example, if the resource is forest or range land. Alternatively,
increasing costs might simply reect the impact of increased demand on the price of purchasing and installing
an exclusion technology, such as with fencing range land or preventing access to a lakeshore.
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We assume that resources previously privatized require only maintenance of property rights, and that
this is less expensive than undertaking new privatizations. The cost of property rights maintenance has
only quantitative implications for our analysis; therefore we assume this cost is zero.
In choosing whether or not to privatize each individual needs to compare their equilibrium utilities under
the two property rights regimes. This requires that we rst solve the individuals utility maximization
problems under these two regimes.
3.2 Individuals that Exploit the Commons
We assume that there is a static commons problem in that individuals who exploit the commons maximize
max
fccit;lcitg
(ccit)

(T   lcit) (8)
subject to ccit = 
c
t l
c
it
 
1
H

taking as given the rate of exploitation. Denoting the lagrange multiplier by ,
the rst order conditions for this problem are given by
 (ccit)
 1
(T   lcit) +  = 0; (9)
  (ccit) (T   lcit) 1   ct

1
H

= 0: (10)
Using the symmetry of the model, we can write the rate of exploitation of the commons as
Hc =
P
i l
c
it
n  Zt =
n^lcit
n  Zt (11)
where bn denotes the number of producers who choose to exploit the common property resource. However,
since each producer who privatizes receives exactly one unit of the resource, the number of producers left
exploiting the commons must be exactly bn = n   Zt: Therefore we can write the rate of exploitation as
H = lcit:
Making this substitution, and using standard methods, it can be shown that the optimal labor supply is
given by
lcit =

 + 
T: (12)
Therefore, the rate of exploitation is simply Hc = +T: Substituting this expression into (2) gives the
individual producers optimal demand for the consumption good:
ccit = 
c
t


 + 
T
1 
: (13)
The producers indirect utility function is then given by
vcit (
c
t ; T ) = (
c
t)



 + 
(1 )

 + 

T (1 )+: (14)
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3.3 Individuals that Exploit Privatized Resources
Individuals that exploit private resources fully account for the e¤ects of their own exploitation on the
productivity of the resource and maximize
max
fcpit;lpitg
(crit)

(T   lpit) (15)
subject to crit = 
r
t l
r
it

1
lrit

: The rst order conditions for this problem are given by
 (crit)
 1
(T   lrit) +  = 0 (16)
  (crit) (T   lrit) 1    (1  )rt (lrit)  = 0: (17)
Again, usual methods give
lrit =

 (1  )
 (1  ) + 

T; (18)
crit = 
r
it

 (1  )
 (1  ) + 

T
1 
: (19)
The indirect utility function for producers exploiting private resources is therefore
vrit (
r
it; T ) = (
r
it)


 (1  )
 (1  ) + 
(1 )

 (1  ) + 

T (1 )+: (20)
Before continuing, note that the environmental damage to the commons is greater than the environmental
damage incurred by private resources. Specically, since  2 (0; 1) ;
Hc =


 + 

T >

 (1  )
 (1  ) + 

T = Hr; (21)
and d (Hc) > d (Hr) : This is a direct consequence of the static commons problem. Individual resource
exploiters are quite aware that they face this problem and that it impacts the utility levels they enjoy.
The incentive to privatize the resource stems directly from the desire to avoid the deleterious e¤ects of the
commons problem.
3.4 The Decision to Privatize
If an individual chooses to privatize a unit of resource, they incur a time cost of p (Zt) ; hence we rewrite the
indirect utility function (18) to obtain the value of privatization:
vrit (
c
t ; T   p (Zt)) = (ct)

 (1  )
 (1  ) + 
(1 )

 (1  ) + 

(T   p (Zt))(1 )+ : (22)
Notice that we have replaced rit with 
c
it: In the period when a producer privatizes a unit of resource, it
is taken from the commons and therefore enjoys the current commons level of quality. So, in the initial
period of privatization, resource quality is identical between commons and private property. The decision
to privatize is driven, not by a desire to benet from a higher immediate resource quality, but to avoid the
static commons problem.
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Individuals will choose to privatize as long as vrit (
c
t ; T   p (Zt))  vcit (ct ; T ). The equilibrium level of
privatization, Z; can therefore be found as the solution to
(ct)



 + 
(1 )

 + 

T (1 )+
= (cit)


 (1  )
 (1  ) + 
(1 )

 (1  ) + 

(T   p (Zt))(1 )+ ; (23)
which can be reduced to
p
 
Zt

= T
241   (1  )  + 
 + 

1
1  
 (1 )
(1 )+
35 : (24)
This gives an implicit solution for Zt: Notice that Zt is both time and resource quality invariant, and is
determined by each individual trading o¤ the time cost of privatization against the gains from avoiding the
commons problem. Assuming that p (Zt) is bijective, we can write Z = p 1 (), which is constant. For
simplicity, we also assume that n = t Z, so that all resources will be privatized in time t = t: This also
implies that no producer will be left without resources when the commons is completely privatized. This
assumption has no substantive consequences for our results.
4 The Evolution of Total Resource Quality
Environmental quality, Et; is measured by the productive capacity of the resource. For common property
resources, environmental quality would therefore be ct (n  Zt) : Thus, environmental quality in this model
reects all in situ benets the resource may yield, but does not account for any nonuse value. To study the
evolution of the resource we need to examine two dynamic regimes, the time period up to full privatization
of the resource, 0 < t < t, and the time period after full privatization, t  t.
4.1 The Evolution of Total Resource Quality with a Mix of Common and Pri-
vate Ownership.
For 0 < t < t we may successively substitute (6) into itself to obtain the following expression for environ-
mental quality
Et<t = n

tc0 +
 
n  t ZKc tX
j=1
j
j 1 + ZKc
tX
j=1
(t  j) 
t j + ZKr
tX
j=1
j
t j + Zd
tX
j=1

j 1
= n
tc0 +K
c 1
1  


n
 
1  
t  t Z + Z 

1  

 
1  
t
+ ZKr

1
1  


t  


1  
t
1  


+ Zd

1  
t
1  


: (25)
WhereKc   d
h

+

T
i
; Kr   d
h
(1 )
(1 )+

T
i
and d  d
h
(1 )
(1 )+

T
i
 d
h
(1 )
(1 )+
  
T   p  Zti.
The evolution of environmental quality over the period 0 < t < t can then be understood by di¤erencing
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this equation to obtain
E j 0<t<t  Et   Et 1 = nc0
t 1 (
  1) +Kc

1
1  


n
t 1 (1  
)   1  
t Z
+ ZKr

1  
t
1  


+ Zd
t 1: (26)
We immediately note that in this regime the evolution of resource quality has some simple properties
that we gather together in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If full privatization takes "long enough" then the time path of resource quality is "U" shaped.
(i) As t! 1 ) E j0<t<t! A < 0 if c0  :
(ii) As t! t !1) E j0<t<t! B > 0
(iii) 9 a unique t > 0 for which E j0<t<t= 0 if c0  :
Proof. Appendix.
Provided that the initial quality of the resource is at or above its unexploited steady state level, c0  ;
its quality must be degraded in the rst period of exploitation. This follows simply from the fact that both
the common and private ownership steady states lie below the unexploited steady state and convergence
is monotonic in both property rights regimes. If full privatization takes "long enough" this implies that
the rate at which the resource is transformed from common to private ownership is slow. Units of the
resource under common ownership converge to a lower steady state of environmental quality than those
under private ownership. If the privatization process is slow, then many units of the resource degrade to a
level of environmental quality below the privatized steady state; when these units are eventually privatized
their quality must rise. This yields the U shaped time path for total environmental quality.
4.2 The Evolution of Total Resource Quality with Full Private Ownership.
Once all of the resource has been privatized the resource quality dynamic depends only on the relative rates
of damage and recovery and not, by denition, on changes in ownership regime. Writing environmental
quality in t as Et we have from (25)
Et = Z
24t
tc0 +Kc t 1X
j=1
(t  j) 
j +Kr
tX
j=1
j
t
 j + d
tX
j=1

j 1
35
= t Z
"

t

c0 +
Kc
t (1  
)
 


 
1  
t
1  
   t

t

!
+
Kr
t (1  
)
 
t   

 
1  
t
1  

!
+
d
t

1  
t
1  

#
: (27)
Since t Z = n is the xed size of the resource, the bracketed term is private resource quality. Denote this
by rt : Then in each subsequent period, environmental quality is given by
Et+m = n
24
mrt +Kr m 1X
j=0

j
35 = n 
mrt +Kr 1  
m1  


: (28)
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The change in environmental quality is now determined solely by the change in the quality parameter. That
is,
E j tt = n
 
rt+m+1   rt+m

= n


m+1rt +K
r 1  
m+1
1  
   

mrt  Kr
1  
m
1  


= n

rt
 

m+1   
m  Kr
(1  
)
 

m+1   
m : (29)
This immediately leads to a second lemma.
Lemma 2 With full privatized ownership
(i) The system converges monotonically to the steady state nKr

1
1 


:
(ii) Convergence is from above with declining environmental quality if rt >
Kr
(1 
)
(iii) Convergence is from below with increasing environmental quality if rt <
Kr
(1 
) .
Proof. Appendix.
The intuition here is quite straightforward. Once all the resource has been privatized the dynamics
become quite simple, the level of exploitation of each unit of the resource occurs at a constant rate giving a
constant level of degradation. If at the time the resource is fully privatized its environmental quality di¤ers
from the fully privatized steady state, then it converges monotonically to this level from above or below as
appropriate.
4.3 Environmental Quality Time Paths
We now have all the components we require to characterize the possible time paths for environmental quality
Proposition 3 Environmental quality will follow a U-shaped curve if (i) t < t, or if (ii) Et <
nKr

1
1 


;but will decline monotonically otherwise.
Proof. Follows immediately from lemmas 1 and 2.
The proposition can perhaps best be understood with the help of a diagram
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Time
Et
Total Resource
       Quality
t* t** = n/q
All Commons
    Privatized
Unexploited
Steady State
Privatized
Steady State
Commons
Steady State
Equation (25)
Equation (28)
Time Path of Resource
           Quality
Figure 1a: Full Privatization after Environmenetal
Recovery t > t:
Time
Et
Total Resource
       Quality
t** = n/q
All Commons
    Privatized
Unexploited
Steady State
Privatized
Steady State
Commons
Steady State
Equation (25)
Equation (28)
Time Path of Resource
           Quality
Figure 1b: Monotonic Environmental Degredation,
t  t
Two possibilities present themselves. First, as in gure 1a, privatization proceeds slowly while the
dynamics of environmental change are relatively fast. Hence we have the story described by lemma 1. Envi-
ronmental quality rapidly approaches the commons steady state dipping below the full privatization steady
state. However eventually more units of the resource are privatized, these rapidly recover and aggregate
environmental quality rises to the fully privatized steady state. The second possibility is as described in
gure 1b, privatization occurs rapidly relative to the rate of environmental degradation. The commons is
fully privatized before the level of environmental quality drops below the fully privatized steady state. Hence
environmental quality degrades monotonically.
5 The Severity of Environmental Damage and Speed of Environ-
mental Recovery: Some Simulation Results.
Our preceding analysis demonstrates that as property rights evolve from a common to private property
regime, environmental quality can follow either a U-shaped time path or one of monotonic degradation. In
the case where the time path is U-shaped we wish to investigate what is crucial in determining how long
it takes for environmental degradation to reverse itself. We also wish to investigate what is important in
determining the severity of the environmental damage that must be experienced before an improvement
occurs. Analysis of the model does not readily provide answers to these questions, however numerical
simulations provide some interesting insights.
In order to analyze the factors determining the length of time that elapses before environmental qual-
ity begins to improve, note from the proof of Lemma 1, that prior to full privatization the derivative of
environmental quality with respect to time can be written as
A
t +B
t+1 + C (30)
where A = (1   
)c0n ln (
)   d Z ln (
)  Kcn ln (
) ; B = K
r Z ln(
)
(1 
)   K
c Z ln(
)
(1 
) ; and C = Z (K
r  Kc) :
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The last term, C; is positive since Kr > Kc: That the rst term is negative is demonstrated in the proof
of Lemma 1. The middle term, B, is negative since Kr > Kc and ln (
) < 0: Since 
 < 1, the rst
two terms disappear as t ! 1: Therefore, as long as there is plenty of commons available, environmental
quality will eventually begin to improve. Furthermore, it should be clear that the magnitude of 
 is pivotal
in determining the speed with which environmental quality begins to improve: the lower is 
; the faster
the rst two terms will approach zero. In other words, as  , the natural speed of adjustment to the steady
state, increases, environmental quality will improve more rapidly.
In addition, any change in the parameters that increases A or B, in absolute value, will prolong the
degradation, while any change that increases C will result in earlier environmental improvement. For
example, the greater is the ratio of initial environmental quality to the unexploited steady state, 
c
0
 ; the
longer it will take for environmental quality to begin to improve. This occurs since, as 
c
0
 increases,
environmental quality must fall farther to reach its new, exploited steady state.
To see the impact of the various parameters on the length of time before environmental improvement
occurs, consider the following simplied model. First, choose p (Zt) = Zt and d (H) = H: Second, assume
that agentsutility functions exhibit constant returns to scale, so that  = 1   : We examine the impact
of altering the exogenous factors by specifying a benchmark set of parameters, and simulating the model
while allowing one parameter at a time to vary from the benchmark case. While this is not an exhaustive
analysis, it does provide some insights into the impact these parameters have on the dynamics of the model.
For the benchmark case, we choose  =  = 0:5; implying an equal budget share of consumption and
leisure in the agents optimal choice.  = 0:1 is a su¢ ciently low speed of adjustment to allow for substantial
environmental damage. The number of individuals must be large enough for a substantial commons problem
to exist, we therefore choose n = 100: The ratio of initial to unexploited steady state environmental quality,
c0
 ; should be greater than or equal to one in order to conform to the conditions in our proof. We therefore
choose this ratio to be one in the benchmark case and allow it to increase in the simulations.3 Finally,
T is arbitrarily set to 24 and  = 0:582557: This latter choice is made to ensure that the quantity of
resources privatized in each time period is an integer, specically, 2. This restriction is imposed to keep
the benchmark case consistent with the analytical model, however, to reduce computational costs, it is not
maintained throughout the simulations.
The table below shows the percentage change from the benchmark case of the time to environmental
improvement, while changing various parameters.
Parameter Range of Values Percentage Change
 0.01 to 0.99 218.31% to -94.48%
4 0.38 to 0.50 3.37% to 0.0%
0.50 to 0.99 0.0% to 123.40%
 0.01 to 0.99 500.84% to -75.60%
c0
 1.05 to 4.0 0.0% to 45.89%
n 50 to 199 -23.93% to 24.94%
(31)
As the table indicates, the length time to environmental improvement is most sensitive to changes in  ,
 and : We noted above that higher values of  imply environmental quality naturally adjusts faster to the
3 It should be noted that this condition is su¢ cient for environmental quality to initially decline, however it is not necessary.
For various parameterizations, this ratio may be less than one and initial environmental quality will still decline.
4Solutions of the model are not well-behaved for values of  less than 0.38 in this highly stylized version of the model.
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steady value. As a result environmental quality recovers more quickly and the turning point occurs earlier.
The assumption of constant returns to scale in utility implies that an increase in , the budget share of leisure,
is accompanied by an equiproportional decrease in the budget share of consumption. Therefore, increasing
 causes consumers to devote more time to leisure and less to exploiting the resource and environmental
quality declines much more slowly. As a result, the time to reach the minimum is considerably extended.
The parameter  captures the marginal loss in production due to resource exploitation. Low values of 
correspond to a large impact of exploitation, since production is a function of the inverse of the rate of
exploitation. It follows that, for low values of ; the resource is degraded rapidly and the recovery time
is prolonged. Higher values of ; imply a mild impact on production, and resource quality improves more
rapidly.
Also of interest is the total amount of environmental damage before quality begins to improve. The
table below indicates the percentage change in environmental quality from its initial to minimum points.
As the table indicates, environmental quality is once again most sensitive to  ;  and : Higher values of 
correspond to a rapid rate of natural recovery, and so the maximum environmental loss is relatively mild as
 approaches one. As  approaches one, consumers devote more of their time to leisure and the maximum
environmental loss is low. Similarly for : Higher values of  correspond to a milder impact of exploitation
on production. This allows producers to achieve their desired level of consumption with lower exploitation
levels, and therefore the total environmental loss is decreased.
Parameter Range of Values Percentage Change
 0.01 to 0.99 100% to 11.95%
 0.38 to 0.99 100% to 2.36%
 0.01 to 0.99 100% to 32.44%
c0
 1.05 to 4.0 94.16% to 83.60%
n 50 to 199 90.81% to 100%
(32)
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a simple model that generates a U-shaped pattern for environmental
quality solely as a result of the evolution of private property over a formerly common property resource.
Initially a xed set of producers jointly exploit a common property resource and resource quality declines.
For a one-time, xed cost producers can avoid the commons problem by privatizing a portion of the resource.
In the equilibrium, we show that the commons will eventually be entirely privatized, and resource quality
will improve as producers reduce the rate at which they exploit the now private resource.
Although the model is highly stylized, it does yield some important implications. First, it contributes
to the underlying theory by demonstrating that an EKC may occur independent of consumer preferences
and production technology. Instead, when faced with an externality that reduces the marginal product of
their labor, producers nd it optimal to eliminate the commons problem by privatizing the resource.
Second, while government is not formally modeled in this paper, the results imply that policies devoted
to reducing the costs of establishing private property rights, and protecting those rights once established, can
improve environmental quality. Improving access to legal institutions and law enforcement, even when not
directly related to environmental stewardship, may improve environmental quality by providing incentives
for more e¢ cient behavior.
We have presented a simple model where producers consider only a static commons problem. An
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important extension of this paper would be to model agents who may realize a stream of benets, or costs,
and so may be e¤ected by a dynamic as well as static commons problem. Intuitively we doubt that this
would have signicant qualitative implications, but the quantitative consequences might be large. Also,
in our model, producers directly experience the negative impact of overexploitation. An economy where
the costs of environmental degradation are borne, in part or wholly, by a group who do not directly benet
from production may provide a richer framework for further results. Finally, privatizing resources may alter
considerably the distribution of wealth in an economy. The model could be extended to explore the social
welfare e¤ects when some agents are net losers in privatization.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:. Taking the limits of (26)
E j 0<t<t  Et   Et 1 = nc0
t 1 (
  1) +Kc

1
1  


n
t 1 (1  
)   1  
t Z
+ ZKr

1  
t
1  


+ Zd
t 1:
as t! 1 and t!1 provides
lim
t!1
E j 0<t<t ! nc0 (
  1) +Kc
 
n  Z+ ZKr + Zd
= n (  c0) 
 
n  Z d  
 + 

T

  Zd

(1  ) 
(1  )  + 
 
T   p  Zt  A < 0
and
lim
t!1E j0<t<t! (K
r  Kc) Z

1
1  


 B > 0
To show that the turning point exists and is unique requires solving (26) for E j0<t<t= 0;which may be
written as
nc0

t


  1



+Kc

1
1  


n
t


  1



   1  
t Z
+ ZKr

1  
t
1  


+ Zd


t



= 0
It is now a simple matter to rearrange this expression and take logs to give
t =
ln

(Kr Kc) Z( 11 
 )
(Kr Kc) Z( 11 
 ) nc0(
 1
 )+Kc( n
 )+d(
Z

 )

ln

since ln
 < 0 we require ln

(Kr Kc) Z( 11 
 )
(Kr Kc) Z( 11 
 ) nc0(
 1
 )+Kc( n
 )+d(
Z

 )

< 0
or
(Kr Kc) Z( 11 
 )
(Kr Kc) Z( 11 
 ) nc0(
 1
 )+Kc( n
 )+d(
Z

 )
< 1. Since Kr > Kc this reduces to (1  
)nc0 > nKc + Zd
which may be reexpressed as
nc0 > n

  d


 + 

T

+ Z

d

(1  ) 
(1  )  + 

T

  d

(1  ) 
(1  )  + 
 
T   p  Zt
Hence if c0   we know n > Z and the result follows from d
h

+

T
i
> d
h
(1 )
(1 )+

T
i
Proof of Lemma 2:. Taking the limit of (29) as t!1 we obtain
lim
t!1E jtt! 0:
Further rearranging (29) provides
E jtt= n
 

m+1   
mrt   Kr1  


:
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Hence since
 

m+1   
m < 0 it follows that
E jttR 0 as rt Q
Kr
1  
 :
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